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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I analyze the economic forces that drive liquidity in stock markets.
Liquidity is a key element for well-functioning stock markets as it has important
repercussions for traders, trading venues (stock exchanges or alternative trading
systems) and listed firms. Moreover, also the stability of the financial system as
whole benefits from liquidity. I first provide a definition of liquidity. Subse-
quently, several dimensions of liquidity within one market are analyzed. Next to
order processing costs, inventory and asymmetric information, the relation
between market design and liquidity is studied as well. Finally, I investigate the
impact of intermarket competition on liquidity. I not only consider competition
between stock exchanges, but also include alternative trading systems.
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This paper aims to analyze the forces that drive liquidity in stock mar-
kets, as well as of the implications of liquidity for different agents in
the market, i.e. traders/investors, stock exchanges and listed firms.
Although essentially the same asset is traded, a stock, the institutional
setup of the trading process itself differs considerably across stock mar-
kets around the world. Examples include whether or not market mak-
ers or a trading floor are present, rules on transparency, .... Given this
myriad of possible organizations of exchanges and the recent evolu-
tion of them, the performance of the various types of markets is an
important issue. A key aspect in evaluating the performance of a par-
ticular trading system is its liquidity1. A clear illustration of the fact that
the trading environment and liquidity have an impact can be found in
a recent study by Harris, Panchapagesan and Werner (2006). They
investigate delistings from NASDAQ to the pink sheets. These were
accompanied by a large decline in liquidity since spreads almost tripled,
as did volatility. This decline in liquidity is associated with a signifi-
cant wealth-loss to shareholders of about 19%. Liquidity is of crucial
importance to a number of agents. It is obviously a concern to traders,
since it determines their cost of buying and selling assets. However, it
is also an important aspect for stock exchanges themselves in order to
attract order flow from traders and in the competition for order flow
with other exchanges or alternative trading systems. This may create a
liquidity externality: a liquid market attracts more order flow, creating
in this way even more liquidity. Liquidity is also an argument in con-
vincing firms to list on their exchange, as it is a determinant of their
cost of capital and their decision about the optimal capital structure.
In this paper, after providing a brief description of stock markets in
Section II, I tackle different issues. First, in Section III, I provide a
definition of liquidity. Although at first sight a simple and straight-
forward concept, it is often not entirely clear what precisely comprises
liquidity. This lack of a uniform definition has lead to different
interpretations of liquidity and consequently to different views. There-
fore, I clearly state in Section III the definition of liquidity to which
I adhere in the paper. This definition accounts for the fact that liq-
uidity is not a monolithic concept, but implies different interacting
dimensions.
Secondly, Section IV investigates the question whether liquidity is a
desirable feature. This is indeed a rather common view today, not only
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press. But this has not always been the case, and a priori, one could
argue that it is not altogether straightforward why liquidity would be
beneficial. In Section IV, I confront two views of liquidity. The “dark”
view of liquidity starts from the fact that low trading costs might ben-
efit the individual, but may impose a cost to the market. In some cases,
this might even lead to financial instability in the financial system. The
policy implication in this case would be to restrict liquidity. In con-
trast, the “bright” view of liquidity counters these arguments and high-
lights the positive effects of liquidity. Rather than imposing a cost, it
attracts traders to the market by facilitating and benefiting the trading
process. One could say that in this way, a positive liquidity external-
ity is created. In this view, liquidity should be enhanced by authori-
ties and not restrained. The latter, bright view of liquidity is also
termed by O’Hara (1995) the market microstructure view to liquidity.
It is this approach that will be taken in this paper. Market microstruc-
ture is the part of the literature in financial economics that focusses
on the economic forces underlying the trading process and price for-
mation. Therefore, it is particularly well suited for studying the impact
of the design of stock markets on liquidity. Moreover, it starts from the
behavior of individual agents, be this a trader, an exchange, or a dealer.
Subsequently, in Section V , I discuss the different dimensions of liq-
uidity in quote driven (dealer) and order driven (limit order) markets.
Also, I investigate the impact of other elements in market design, i.e.
transparency, anonymity, tick size2 and floor versus electronic trading
on liquidity.
Until that point in the paper, the focus is entirely on one single mar-
ket. However, nowadays trading of a particular stock often takes place
simultaneously in a number of trading venues. This competition between
trading venues, sometimes with different institutional characteristics,
can be expected to have an impact on liquidity. This topic is studied in
Section VI. Clearly this section is relevant for stock exchanges. Finally,
all main results are summarized in Section VII.
This paper is not to first to provide an overview of the market
microstructure literature. An excellent study of the early theoretical lit-
erature can be found in O’Hara (1995). Madhavan (2000) and Biais,
Glosten and Spatt (2005) provide surveys of both theoretical and empir-
ical work. Lyons (2001) provides an accessible review of the microstruc-
ture of foreign exchange markets. This paper differs from these surveys
in its scope. I focus on a crucial property of a financial markets: its
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of both determinants and implications. The determinants include trader
behavior, but also the design of a market. Moreover, I show that inter-
market competition and interaction have important implications. Fur-
thermore, I do not limit the implications of liquidity to traders, but also
show the importance for exchanges and listed firms. To my knowledge,
this is the first paper to provide a comprehensive and integrated
overview of all these various aspects of liquidity.3
II. INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP OF STOCK MARKETS
Throughout the world, a wide variety of trading systems exists4,
allowing agents to trade financial assets, such as stocks, bonds, for-
eign exchange and derivatives. Each system has its own properties and
rules. The differences between them relate to a number of market char-
acteristics such as the presence of market makers, pre- and post-trade
transparency or the type of orders allowed. For instance, because they
do not provide extensive information about order flow, or about bind-
ing bid and ask quotes, foreign exchange markets offer in general less
transparency than stock exchanges (see Lyons (2001)).
In this paper I restrict the attention to the analysis of stock markets.
But even between stock markets, large differences exist, see e.g.
Domowitz and Steil (1999) or Jain (2002) for a survey. In general,
stock markets can be classified along two main lines: order driven
versus quote driven systems, and periodic versus continuous systems.
In a quote driven or dealer market, a market maker posts bid and ask
prices at which he wants to buy or sell and takes the opposite side of
each trade. In an order driven or limit order market, traders interact
directly with each other without intermediation. Periodic systems only
allow trading at specific points in time, while in continuous markets,
trading can occur anytime when the market is opened. In practice,
often hybrid forms are in place. For instance, on NYSE, market makers
(specialists) compete with a public limit order book. On Euronext
(a limit order market), market makers exist for some very small stocks.
In addition, stock exchanges often use a batch auction (periodic
trading) after a pre-opening or closing period during which orders can
be submitted but no trading takes place, while relying on continuous
trading during the day. Next to these two main characteristics, each
market has its own trading rules, including those on the type of orders
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and a floor versus screen based trading system. Moreover, it goes with-
out saying that the set-up of an exchange is not static. For instance,
the London Stock Exchange, originally a pure dealer market, intro-
duced a limit order book for stocks in the FT100 index from 20 Octo-
ber 1997 onwards (the SETS-system). Also rules about transparency,
anonymity, ... , have been prone to change. Finally, a recent develop-
ment is the emergence of alternative trading systems (ATS). These
compete with the “traditional” exchanges for order flow. In general
ATS can be divided into two main groups: electronic communication
networks (ECNs) and crossing networks (CNs)5.
Table 1 presents an overview of a number of financial markets and
their main characteristics. It demonstrates some of the key differences
between major financial centres as NYSE or Euronext. Crossing net-
works and to a lesser extend FOREX markets are opaque trading




Euronext Euronext NYSE CNs ECNs FOREX
Pre-Opening
Continuous x x x x
Floor-Based x
Limit Order Book x x x x
Dealer x x
Pre-trade Prices x x x
Post Trade Info x x x x
Note: Euronext may have a specialist for very small stocks to guarantee liquid-
ity. This is however a decision at the discretion of the listed firm. FOREX
markets have indicative pre-trade prices but these are not binding, in con-
trast to a dealer’s quotes on NYSE. Crossing networks (CNs) have a book
in which orders are stored, but this book only contains orders specifying
a quantity and not a price in contrast to limit orders in a limit order book.
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Despite the omnipresence of the concept “liquidity” in the finance
literature of several domains and despite being seemingly a simple
concept, there is surprisingly little agreement about its definition.
O’Hara (2004) makes a comparison with pornography: it is hard to
define, but you know it, when you see it. An early definition of liquidity
can be found in Keynes (1930), who considers an asset as more liquid
if it is more certainly realizable at short notice without loss. Within the
context of this paper, I start from the following definition, which goes
along the same lines: “a market is liquid if traders can quickly buy or
sell large numbers of shares without large price effects”. It refers to the
willingness of a market participant, a liquidity supplier, to take the
opposite side in a transaction initiated by another trader, the liquidity
demander. Note that a supplier can be a dealer but also another trader,
as in limit order markets6. Although having the advantage of simplic-
ity, the definition is also general and hard to implement in practice
when analyzing liquidity. In order to make the definition more spe-
cific, Black (1971), O’Hara (1995) and Harris (1990) identify several
dimensions of liquidity. Harris (1990) distinguishes four. The first one
is width, referring to the bid-ask spread for a given number of shares
and commissions and fees to be paid per share. Secondly, depth is the
number of shares that can be traded at given bid and ask prices. The
third one, immediacy, refers to how quickly trades of a given size can
be done at a given cost. The final aspect is resiliency. It characterizes
how fast prices revert to former levels after they changed in response
to large order flow imbalances initiated by uninformed traders. It is
clear that these different dimensions do not stand independently on
their own, but may interact with each other. For instance, if a trader is
patient and does not need to trade immediately, she may obtain better
prices and/or be able to trade a larger amount at given prices. In this
case width and depth depend on immediacy.
IV. LIQUIDITY: A TWO-SIDED TALE
After having defined the concept of liquidity, the natural question arises
whether liquidity is important and desirable? This question has attracted
quite some controversy over the years. O’Hara ((1995), (2004)) sum-
marizes the two opposing sides under a “dark” view and a “bright”
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is illustrated by Keynes ((1935), p. 155). He writes: “Of all the maxims
of orthodox finance none, surely, is more anti-social than the fetish of
liquidity, the doctrine that it is a positive virtue on the part of invest-
ment institutions to concentrate their holdings of ‘liquid’ securities.
It forgets that there is no such thing as liquidity of investment for
the community as a whole”. In this view, liquidity is a source of desta-
bilization in markets. The reasoning is that liquid markets are focused
mainly on the short term and investors do no longer consider fundamen-
tals when making their investment decision. The resulting instability
can affect other markets and this contagion might lead to instability in
the financial system as a whole. Moreover, liquidity can be linked to
corporate governance problems. Coffee (1991) notes: “The liquidity
promoted by U.S. policies has obvious benefits: investors can encash
their assets quickly and diversify cheaply. The same policies, however,
impair corporate governance by encouraging diffuse stockholding and
discouraging active investing. Diffuse stockholders face more serious
collective action problems∞∞…∞∞”. Adherents to this view thus recommend
to restrict liquidity. The costs of trading should be increased to force
traders to internalize the social cost of liquidity. Measures consistent
with this view include circuit breakers and short sale restrictions. It is
also the reasoning behind the famous suggestion of Tobin when sug-
gesting a tax on financial speculation: “My proposal is to throw some
sand in the wheels of our excessively efficient international markets”. 
Contrary to the dark side just discussed, the “bright” view stresses
the importance and the benefits of liquidity for a number of agents in
financial markets, including traders, stock exchanges and listed firms.
The reasoning is that investors are more likely to participate in the
market if they are able to buy and sell stocks easily, quickly and at low
costs, or in other words: when liquidity is high. This greater number
of participants limits the price impact of trades and thus increases the
stability in the market. The obvious policy implication is then exactly
the opposite of the one before. Authorities should enhance liquidity as
much as possible and any “sand in the wheels” of the financial sys-
tem, will impede this objective. This bright view is rooted in the mar-
ket microstructure literature. This literature investigates the forces
affecting trades, quotes and prices. These forces can be economic
motives of agents, but also the organization of the markets in which
trading takes place. It demonstrates clearly the beneficial effects of
additional liquidity for a number of parties and provides ample support
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liquidity since it allows them to buy and sell assets at a lower cost.
In addition, it affects their portfolio strategy. Vayanos (2004) shows in
a model that periods of high volatility are associated with a flight to
liquidity in the sense that the risk premium investors require per unit
of volatility increases. Moreover, illiquid assets become riskier since
their market betas increase. The fact that liquidity is a risk factor that
is priced in the market is confirmed in recent empirical research by
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), among others. This means that liquid-
ity can be viewed as risk-reducing, and investors will therefore be
more willing to hold assets that have greater liquidity. An extensive
overview of the literature on liquidity, liquidity risk and asset pricing
can be found in Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005). Secondly,
liquidity is important for stock exchanges. It is an argument in attract-
ing firms to (cross-)list. Pagano, Randl, Roell and Zechner (2001)
show that firms are more likely to cross-list in liquid markets. More-
over, it is a key variable in the competition with other exchanges for
order flow as shown in Parlour and Seppi (2003). Finally, given that
liquidity is a determinant of asset returns, it influences also decisions
of firms on the optimal capital structure. Whether a firm finances
investments by means of issuing shares, bonds or via debt or internal
finance, is then likely to depend, among other things, on liquidity in
stock and bond markets. Ellul and Pagano (2005) demonstrate that
liquidity risk in the secondary market is a determinant of the under-
pricing of initial public offerings (IPO). Lipson and Mortal (2006)
show that firms that have more liquid equity, tend to have lower lever-
age and are more likely to choose equity over debt when they need
new capital.
While this bright view highlights a number of benefits of liquidity,
it does not completely rule out the occurrence of global financial insta-
bility, which can still arise if the liquidity in different assets moves
together. This so-called commonality in liquidity is documented in,
among others, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Hasbrouck
and Seppi (2001) for the NYSE. Brockman and Chung (2002) find evi-
dence for commonality in an order driven market (the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange). However, as O’Hara (2004) points out, in general this does
not need to lead to financial instability. She gives two arguments. First,
if investors drop one asset, but stay in the market in other assets, this
“flight to quality” (see also Vayanos (2004) discussed earlier) means
instability remains local and not global. Secondly, commonality might
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ber of potential buyers and sellers increases, stability is improved. As
an example, O’Hara refers to the use of derivatives that allow investors
to hedge credit risk on bonds. By separating the risk-bearing and invest-
ing roles, these linked markets provide a mechanism to provide liquid-
ity to the market as a whole. This possibility is not considered by
Keynes and other adherents of the dark view above.
V. THE MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE APPROACH
TO LIQUIDITY
As argued, the discussion of liquidity in this paper is grounded in the
market microstructure literature on financial markets. The terminology
“market microstructure” stems from the title of an article by Garman
(1976). He investigates market making and inventory costs. Since then,
it has been a collective term for the (financial) literature describing
economic forces affecting trades, quotes and prices, i.e. the process
through which investor demands are translated into transactions.
A summary of the complete literature however, is outside the scope of
this paper7. Instead, I focus on one particular topic: I analyze the
insights that the literature on market microstructure offers on liquid-
ity in stock markets. As argued in Section II, a wide variety of trading
mechanisms for stocks exist. A main distinction is the one between
quote driven (dealer) and order driven (limit order) markets. I there-
fore start this section with a discussion of different aspects of liquid-
ity in both market types. In a third subsection, I compare dealer and
limit order markets with respect to liquidity. Next to the main dis-
tinction between quote and order driven, markets also differ in a num-
ber of other aspects, e.g. transparency, anonymity and tick size among
others. The impact of these market characteristics on liquidity is inves-
tigated in a fourth subsection.
A. Liquidity in Dealer Markets
Recall that Harris (1990) defines four dimensions of liquidity. The
first one, width, concerned the bid-ask spread for a given number of
shares and commissions and fees to be paid per share. In a first sub-
section, I analyze the determinants of the spread in a dealer market.
Secondly, I turn to the issue of depth. In a third subsection I turn to
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exist between execution cost and execution time. A fourth subsection
deals with resiliency.
1. Components of the Bid-Ask Spread
In a quote driven market, the bid-ask spread is obviously determined
by the bid and ask prices that are set by the dealer. In the literature,
three broad categories of theoretical models have been proposed to
explain dealers’ quoting behavior:
1) order handling costs,
2) inventory models and
3) asymmetric information models.
Order handling costs comprise costs of maintaining a continuous
market, as well as costs of matching and clearing orders. Roll (1984)
develops, under certain assumptions8, a measure for the order han-
dling cost component of the bid-ask spread, based only on data of
transaction prices:
where Pt denotes the transaction price at time t (i.e. the price at which
the shares are bought or sold). This equation says that one can derive
an estimate for the bid-ask spread, just by looking at the covariance
between subsequent changes in transaction prices. Extensions of this
measure can be found in Choi, Salandro and Shastri (1988), who allow
for correlation in the direction of trades, and George, Kaul and
Nimalendran (1991), who correct for time varying expected returns.
However, neither measure takes into account inventory nor asymmet-
ric information.
A second class of models analyzes the impact of inventory. Since
order flow is uncertain for market makers, they have to deal with this
uncertainty when managing their inventory while setting their prices.
A seminal model is Garman (1976). In his model, market makers set
lower prices to sell and higher prices at which they want to buy to
avoid certain failure (similar to the famous “gambler’s ruin” problem).
Amihud and Mendelson (1980) explicitly incorporate inventory in the
pricing decision of a market maker. The dealer’s bid and ask prices (his
decision variables) depend on inventory (the state variable). The
Spread P P P P tt t t =− − − ( ) +− 2 11 cov ,
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inventory position, and exhibit a positive spread. In the model of Stoll
(1978), who focuses on portfolio risk, risk averse dealers have a
desired portfolio composition. They allow actual positions to deviate
from this to accommodate trading, but want to be compensated for
this risk. This compensation is obtained by a (strictly) positive bid-
ask spread. Ho and Stoll (1981) extend this model to a multivariate
framework where order flow and portfolio returns are stochastic.
The origin of information models is usually attributed to Bagehot
(1971). He makes a distinction between liquidity traders or uninformed
traders and informed traders, possessing private information. Liquid-
ity traders (also called noise traders) do not have private information.
They trade for reasons exogenous to the model, e.g. portfolio rebal-
ancing motives or simply because they believe to have information.
Informed traders have private information, e.g. about the value of the
asset, and want to use this information when trading. The spread
reflects a balancing by the market maker between the losses of trad-
ing with informed traders and the gains of trading with uninformed
traders. Models building upon this idea are Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) and Kyle (1985). Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that a bid-
ask spread can be induced by asymmetric information. It may exist
even if market makers have no costs, are risk neutral and face com-
petition. Secondly, they find that transaction prices form a martingale.
In the model of Kyle (1985), there is one informed trader, next to liq-
uidity traders. Traders place their orders simultaneously and the mar-
ket maker observes net order flow and clears all trades at one price.
So in contrast with Glosten and Milgrom (1985), there is no bid-ask
spread in his model. He shows that, in a multi-period framework, infor-
mation is gradually incorporated in transaction prices. Prices still fol-
low a martingale in the sense that an uninformed trader’s expectation
of the price tomorrow is today’s price. Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) extend this model introducing multiple informed traders.
They find more trading and a more rapid revelation of information,
compared to Kyle (1985), due to competition between informed
traders.
Easley and O’Hara (1987) discuss the learning of a market maker.
Informed traders will in general trade at one side of the market. The
direction of trades (buy or sell) and trade size then provide a signal to
market makers, who update their beliefs after each trade. In particu-
lar, two equilibria exist. In a separating equilibrium informed traders
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trade sizes). In this case, the market maker sets no spread for small
trades, but does set one for large trades. In a pooling equilibrium,
informed traders use both small and large trade sizes. Consequently,
market makers set a spread for both small and large trades, although
the large-trade spread is larger.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) investigate the strategic interaction
between informed and uninformed traders. If uninformed traders have
some discretion about when to trade, they show that trading will be con-
centrated in certain periods of the trading day. This may provide an
explanation for the more intense trading at the opening and closing time.
One of the first empirical tests of microstructure models is pre-
sented by Glosten and Harris (1988). They decompose the bid-ask
spread into two parts: one part being due to asymmetric information,
while the remainder can be attributed to inventory costs, market mak-
ers’ risk aversion, ... . They find that the adverse selection component
of the spread is economically not significant for small trades, but
increases with trade size. Huang and Stoll (1997) propose a three-way
decomposition of the spread and find a small, but significant asym-
metric information component. The same holds for the inventory com-
ponent. The order processing component is larger. The spread com-
ponents also differ with trade size. The asymmetric information
component is smaller for large trades than for medium and small
trades. One reasoning for this result might be that large trades are
prenegotiated such that the trade price reflects the information, con-
veyed by the trade.
2. Prices and Depth
So far, I focused on how the dealer sets bid and ask prices. In prac-
tice however, dealer submit price schedules, i.e. combinations of
bid and ask prices and associated bid and ask depth at these prices.
Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) investigate how these price sched-
ules are selected. Interestingly, they find that dealers revise their prices
and depth in response to different events. Depths are revised
in response to transaction of any size, while prices are revised only
when transaction size exceeds quoted depth. Kavajecz and Odders-
White (2001) also find that dealers respond strongly to changes in the
limit order book9. In fact, economically, this turns out to be the most
important factor for revising price schedules.
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Trading costs and prices obtained can be considered as one dimen-
sion of the execution quality of orders. Another dimension is the
speed of execution. One reason why traders prefer faster execution is
that slower execution increases uncertainty over the execution price.
Boehmer, Jennings and Wei (2006) show that markets tend to receive
more order flow if either execution costs decline or the execution
speed increases. Boehmer (2005) finds a negative trade-off between
execution speed and execution cost. He finds that the difference
between execution cost on NASDAQ and NYSE are inversely related
to execution speed, i.e. execution is more costly on NASDAQ but
also faster. Moreover, the difference in cost decreases monotonically
with order size, while the difference in speed increases monotoni-
cally with order size.
4. Resiliency
Resiliency in a dealer market, i.e. how fast prices revert to former lev-
els after they changed in response to large order flow imbalances ini-
tiated by uninformed traders, is analyzed theoretically in Cordella
and Foucault (1999). In their model, dealers are uncertain about when
the next order will arrive in the market. Assume that at some point
in time, the dealer can revise (or set) his quotes. If he observes that
the current best quote in the market, set by another dealer, is above
the competitive price10 of the asset, the dealer is faced with a trade-
off between two possible choices. First, he can opt for quoting the
competitive price. He then executes the next order with certainty and
has a profit equal to the tick size. Secondly, he may decide to under-
cut the current quote by only one tick. In case of executing the next
order, the dealer has a larger profit, but on the other hand, he runs the
risk of being undercut subsequently by another dealer. As a conse-
quence of these two possibilities, execution prices in the market may
deviate from the competitive price. The trading costs faced by traders
thus depend on the speed of convergence of the best quotes to
the competitive price. This speed is governed by two main determi-
nants. First, there is a negative relation between the time for the best
price to adjust to the competitive price and the tick size. The intuition
is that a larger tick size creates a bigger difference between the
expected asset value and the competitive price. If the dealer then
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size is larger. This faster convergence implies also that a larger tick
size does not necessarily result in larger trading costs for traders. Sec-
ondly, a negative relation exists between expected trading costs and
the frequency of quote revisions by dealers. If dealers frequently
revise quotes, the risk is larger that a dealer who does not post the
competitive price is subsequently undercut. The frequency of quote
revisions in turn depends on the market monitoring costs, faced by
the dealer.
Empirically, Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1998) investigate NYSE
trading suspensions. They define resiliency as the ability to absorb
very large shocks. A cross-sectional analysis of all trading suspen-
sions during the period 1974-1988 shows that the various dimensions
of liquidity are substitutes: large-cap stocks have lower bid-ask spreads
at the open but halt more often. In particular, the bid-ask spread of
stocks in the largest decile have a spread at the open that is one-
seventh of the spread of stocks in the smallest decile. However, the
probability of a trading halt in the largest stocks is three times the one
of the smallest stocks. They also find that the NYSE has become
more resilient over their sample period, i.e. the time needed to absorb
unusually large shocks has decreased.
B. Liquidity in Limit Order Markets
1. Introduction
In an order driven or limit order market, no dealers or market makers
are present which have an obligation to supply liquidity. Liquidity is
only provided by traders and their unexecuted limit orders. Hence, if
the supply of limit orders dries up, trading breaks down. Therefore, it
is important to study whether such market mechanism is able to pro-
vide liquidity in all circumstances and especially around shocks. In a
first subsection, I discuss the components of the bid-ask spread, sim-
ilar to the ones analyzed above for a dealer market. Secondly, I turn
to the determinants of liquidity supply and demand. Ultimately, in a
limit order market, all dimensions of liquidity are determined by the
interaction between market orders, demanding liquidity, and limit
orders, supplying liquidity. The factors underlying this choice are then
clearly crucial for liquidity in an order driven market. Finally, I ana-
lyze the issue of resiliency.
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Recall that in a dealer market, three reasons were given for the exis-
tence of the spread: inventory costs, order handling and processing
costs and asymmetric information. In an order driven market, traders
providing liquidity can still be expected to require compensation for
order handling costs. On the other hand, as no trader has an obliga-
tion to make the market and take the opposite side of a trade, inven-
tory is less likely to be important. From a theoretical point of view,
Glosten (1994) shows that the limit-order market will have a positive
bid-ask spread arising from the possibility of trading on private infor-
mation. Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2003) develop a model of an
order driven market where investors differ in their share valuations
and the arrival of news in the market is not common knowledge. They
show that the size of the spread is a function of the differences in val-
uation among investors and of adverse selection.
Empirically de Jong Nijman and Roell (1995) find that on the Paris
Bourse, order processing cost are an important determinant of spreads.
de Jong Nijman and Roell (1996) show that the price impact of trades
increases with trade size. Moreover, inventory control is unimportant.
Ahn, Cai, Hamao and Ho (2002) find that both the adverse selection
and order-processing cost components exhibit U-shaped intraday
patterns in Tokyo. This contrasts with the decline over the day of
the adverse selection component and the increase of the order-process
component during the day on the NYSE (a hybrid market, see
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997)). They also find that
adverse selection costs increase with trade size while order-processing
costs decrease with it. This is also in contrast with NYSE where
medium trades contain more information than large trades (see e.g.
Huang and Stoll (1997)). These studies imply that the process of how
information is incorporated into stock prices through trading on a limit
order market is different from a quote driven or hybrid system.
3. Liquidity Supply and Demand in Order Driven Markets
In a limit order market, all dimensions of liquidity — the bid-ask spread,
depth, immediacy and resiliency — are ultimately determined by the
interaction between market orders, demanding liquidity, and limit
orders, supplying liquidity. Therefore, the choice by traders between
market and limit order is crucial in this respect. Several dynamic
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minants. These include depth (Parlour (1998)), volatility of the asset
(Foucault (1999)), the order arrival rate and the composition of traders
(Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) and Rosu (2006)). I now discuss
each of these determinants more in detail.
Parlour (1998) presents a one-tick dynamic model of a limit order
market where agents choose between market and limit orders. The
execution probability of a limit order is endogenous. She shows that
traders look at both sides of the market (depth at bid and ask side)
when deciding upon their order type, not only to their own side. In
equilibrium, this generates systematic patterns in transaction prices
and order placement strategies even with no asymmetric information.
Foucault (1999) analyzes the impact of the risk of being picked off12
and execution risk on traders’ order placement strategies and trading
costs. A main determinant of the mix between market and limit orders
is the volatility of the asset. The higher volatility, the larger the pro-
portion of limit orders in order flow. The reasoning is that when the
asset’s volatility increases, limit order traders face a higher risk of
being picked off. Therefore, their reservation spreads enlarge. This
increases the cost of market order trading, making it more likely that
limit orders are the optimal trading strategy. The fill rate (the ratio of
filled limit orders to total number of limit orders) is negatively related
to asset volatility.
Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) focus on yet another determi-
nant of a trader’s choice between market and limit orders. They
develop a dynamic model of a limit order market with strategic liq-
uidity traders having different degrees of impatience. In equilibrium,
patient traders tend to submit limit orders, whereas impatient traders
submit market orders. Limit order book dynamics in equilibrium are
mainly determined by the proportion of patient traders and the order
arrival rate. They show that the resiliency of the limit order book
increases in the proportion of patient traders and the waiting cost,
while it decreases in the order arrival rate.
Rosu (2006) develops a continuous-time model of price formation
in a limit order market. The determinants of liquidity in his model are,
as in Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005), the arrival rate of agents in
the market, and the ratio of patient to impatient traders. These variables
then also determine the bid-ask spread and the price impact function.
He finds that in equilibrium, impatient agents always submit market
orders, while patient agents submit limit orders except for the states
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either places a market order, or submits a quick (fleeting) limit order.
This order is then immediately accepted by a trader from the other
side of the book. In states where the book is not full, new limit orders
are always placed inside the bid-ask spread. The point where the limit
order book is full coincides with the time when the bid-ask spread is
at its minimum. This implies that there exists an optimal minimum
spread, despite the fact that tick size is zero in his model. Moreover,
he shows that if multi-unit market orders arrive with probabilities
which do not decrease too fast with order size, then the book exhibits
a hump shape, i.e. limit orders will cluster away from the bid and the
ask. Furthermore, after a market sell order both the bid and ask prices
decrease, with the bid decreasing more than the ask. As a result, the
spread itself widens. Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) explain this phe-
nomenon by asymmetric information. Rosu shows, however, that the
decrease in the ask need not to reflect an information effect. It can also
result from an adjustment by limit order sellers. After they have
observed a decrease in the bid, they realize that the time to execution
of their orders might increase. For this reason, they lower their ask. In
empirical work however, it may be difficult to disentangle waiting
costs and asymmetric information.
Next to theory, a wide body of empirical literature has also emerged.
Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) present an elaborate analysis of the
limit order book and order flow on the Paris Bourse (nowadays
Euronext Paris). They find that the conditional probability on a limit
order is larger when the spread is large or the order book is thin
(i.e. depth is low). This means that liquidity is supplied when it is
valuable and consumed when it is abundant. Moreover, after a market
order, the probability is relatively high that the next order will provide
liquidity, pointing to an interaction between buy and sell sides of the
market. The market responds quickly to market orders, suggesting
competition in liquidity supply. These results also suggest the presence
of traders monitoring the book and waiting for profitable trading
opportunities. Order flow placement is concentrated inside or at the
best prices in the book. A large fraction improves the best bid or ask.
This is especially the case when depth at the best quotes is large. But
despite the concentration of order submissions at the best prices, depth
in the book concentrates behind them, a consequence of the interac-
tion with trading at the best prices. Finally, they also find evidence for
information effects. After large sells, decreasing the best bid, often a
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adjustment in expectations based on the information content of a trade.
Moreover, large sells tend to occur in succession quickly, consistent
with insider trading in Easley and O’Hara ((1987), (1992)).
There exists a large number of other empirical studies, investigating
other order driven markets. Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001) find for the
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong that market depth rises after an increase
in transient volatility and that volatility falls following a rise in depth.
Moreover, transient volatility affects the mix between market and limit
orders. If it increases at the ask (bid) side, more limit sell (buy) orders
are submitted, relative to market orders. As in Biais, Hillion and Spatt
(1995) this means that liquidity is provided when needed. Lehmann and
Modest (1994) and Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995) investigate in detail
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. They conclude that, despite the absence of
market makers, sufficient liquidity is provided by the limit order book.
Hollifield, Miller and Sandas (2004) study liquidity supply and demand
in limit order markets, focusing on the economic determinants of the
traders’ optimal order submissions. The type and timing of order sub-
missions depend on the one hand on the trade-off between price
improvement, execution probability and picking off risk and on the
other hand on the trader arrival rates and trader heterogeneity. The
expected payoffs depend on conditioning information such as informa-
tion about the limit order book and past order submission activity.
Ranaldo (2004) investigates the choice of an order type in the Swiss
Stock Exchange (a pure limit order market). He analyzes how the state
of the limit order book affects a trader’s order submission strategy. He
finds that patient traders become more aggressive when the own (oppo-
site) side book is thicker (thinner), the spread wider, and the temporary
volatility increases. These results show that both sides of the book are
important for a trader when she determines her strategy, as predicted
by Parlour (1998). Finally, he finds systematic differences between the
buy and sell side of the order book. Prior to the submission of any type
of sell orders, the book always shows a larger spread and a thicker sell
side. Also, buy orders are more autocorrelated than are sell orders.
4. Resiliency
Theoretically, resiliency is studied in Foucault, Kadan and Kandel
(2005). As mentioned above, they show that the resiliency of the limit
order book increases in the proportion of patient traders and the
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there is a positive relation between the duration until a transaction,
conditional on the quoted spread for the prior transaction, and market
resiliency. Finally, other things being equal, the resiliency of the limit
order market is always larger when there is a minimum price variation
than in the absence of a minimum price variation.
Empirically, Degryse, de Jong, van Ravenswaaij and Wuyts (2005)
analyze the resiliency of a pure limit order market by investigating the
limit order book (bid and ask prices, spreads, depth and duration),
order flow and transaction prices in a window of best limit updates13
and transactions around aggressive orders. Such orders are defined as
large orders that move prices. Aggressive orders take place when
spreads and depths are relatively low, and they induce bid and ask
prices to be persistently different after the shock. Depth and spread
remain also higher than just before the order, but do return to their
initial level within 20 best limit updates after the shock. Relative to the
sample average, depths stay around their mean before and after aggres-
sive orders, whereas spreads return to their mean after about twenty
best limit updates. The initial price impact of the aggressive order is
partly reversed in the subsequent transactions. However, the aggressive
order produces a long-term effect as prices show a tendency to return
slowly to the price of the aggressive order.
Wuyts (2007) develops an econometric framework to study various
dimensions of liquidity (prices, depth and duration) and for capturing
the interactions between them. In addition, he investigates resiliency,
i.e. how fast best prices, depths and duration recover to their initial,
pre-shock level after the market has been hit by a liquidity shock. The
results clearly demonstrate the importance of incorporating different
dimensions of liquidity in the analysis. In case of a negative liquidity
shock (a shock increasing the spread), he finds a permanent effect on
prices, with returns (in absolute value) ranging from 0.06 to 0.16%,
depending on size and tick size of the stock. Also, he finds an initial
widening of the spread, but it becomes smaller again in subsequent
periods. On the other hand, depth at the best prices increases, initially
with up to 20%. A second main conclusion is that an analysis of liq-
uidity should also allow for asymmetries in dynamics at bid and ask
side of the market, while at the same time accounting for the exis-
tence of a relationship between them.
Wuyts (2006) extends the analysis to liquidity behind the best lim-
its in the order book. When subsequent prices are close to the best
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without an extensive price impact and without deterring liquidity. The
results show a somewhat less favorable image of liquidity than often
found in the literature. After a liquidity shock (in the spread or depth
or in the book beyond the best limits), several dimension of liquidity
deteriorate at the same time. Not only does the inside spread increase,
and depth at the best prices decrease, also the difference between sub-
sequent bid and ask prices may become larger and depth provided at
them decreases. The impacts are often both econometrically and eco-
nomically significant. Also, his findings point to an interaction
between different measures of liquidity, between liquidity at the best
prices and beyond in the book, and between ask and bid side of the
market.
Coppejans, Domowitz and Madhavan (2004) study the resiliency of
the Swedish stock index futures market (OMX). They find that aggre-
gate market liquidity exhibits considerable variation. Strategic traders
time their trades accordingly, reinforcing the concentration of volume
and liquidity in time. Shocks to volatility reduce liquidity and impair
price efficiency, suggesting that automated auctions might be vulner-
able to periodic liquidity crises following sharp market movements.
However, a time-series analysis shows that these effects dissipate
quickly, e.g. they find that shocks to depth are restored in less than
60 minutes. This indicates that the market is resilient.
C. A Comparison of Quote and Order Driven Markets
Although I already pointed to differences between order and quote
driven markets, the results so far where not based on a direct com-
parison of both markets. In this subsection, such direct comparison is
made. Biais, Foucault and Salanie (1998) show theoretically that a
dealer market has a larger spread and inefficient risk sharing, while a
limit order market results in the competitive outcome. This finding is
supported by Theissen (2000) who finds in experiments that continu-
ous auctions have more efficient transaction prices than a dealer mar-
ket. Moreover, the latter faces higher trading costs. The results in both
papers are also consistent with empirical studies comparing both trad-
ing systems. Christie and Schultz (1994) find evidence for collusive
pricing by dealers in NASDAQ but not in NYSE14, and Huang and
Stoll (1996) report larger spreads for NASDAQ stocks, compared to
a matched sample of NYSE stocks. Degryse (1999) compares an order
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sample of cross-listed Belgian stocks. He finds that the order driven
market outperforms the dealer market with respect to trading costs.
More specifically, quoted and effective bid-ask spreads are smaller in
Brussels. Although the market in Brussels is thus tighter, London,
however, provides a deeper market. Finally, he shows that total trad-
ing costs are lower in Brussels for small trade sizes, while the inverse
holds for large trades.
D. Market Design and Liquidity
Next to the distinction between quote and order driven, markets can
differ in a number of design features. I now review the influence of a
number of these characteristics on liquidity. More in particular, I dis-
cuss transparency, anonymity, tick size and the presence of a trading
floor.
1. Transparency
Transparency can be defined as the ability of market participants to
observe information about the trading process. Information here refers
to knowledge on prices, order flow, .... It can be divided in pre- and
post-trade transparency. The former refers to the dissemination of bid
and ask prices, depths, .... Post-trade transparency denotes the publi-
cation of trades and their details (e.g. prices, size). In recent years,
there has been a global trend in financial markets towards more pre-
and post-trade transparency15. Different degrees of both will obviously
affect order submission strategies of traders and hence liquidity. More
transparency is on the one hand associated with more informative
prices, but on the other hand can also hamper liquidity because traders
might be unwilling to reveal their trading intentions. Moreover, it is
unlikely to have the same effect on all market participants. For
instance, informed traders prefer less transparency, while liquidity
traders prefer a larger disclosure. In a study on limit order markets,
Pagano and Roell (1996) find that in general, more pre-trade trans-
parency increases liquidity. The implicit bid-ask spread is narrower
since price setters, who know more, can protect themselves better
against losses to insiders. Moreover, they find that an auction market
offers lower trading costs than a dealer market. This is consistent with
the fact that the limit order book (which traders can scan) offers more
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given, making it difficult to infer the trade price). Rindi (2004) also
finds that for a given proportion of informed traders, liquidity
improves if markets become more transparent. However, if informa-
tion acquisition becomes endogenous, i.e. when agents can choose to
become informed at a cost, the effect may be reversed. The intuition
is that uninformed agents might be reluctant to supply liquidity for
large orders, as these might be information driven. Informed traders
do not face this problem. When (pre-trade) transparency is higher how-
ever, agents have less incentives to become informed. In this way, the
proportion of informed traders decreases, as well as the liquidity pro-
vided by them.
Another aspect of pre-trade transparency is investigated by Boehmer,
Saar and Yu (2005). They study the consequences of making the NYSE
limit order book public16, thereby increasing pre-trade transparency.
They find that traders changed their strategies in response to this event.
More specifically, they submit smaller limit orders and cancel limit
orders in the book more quickly and more often. Moreover, trading
shifts away from floor brokers towards electronic trading. Also NYSE
specialists change their quoting strategies and add less depth to the
quote. The introduction of a public limit order book also leads to an
improvement in informational efficiency, an increase in displayed liq-
uidity in the book, and a decline in the price impact of trades and mar-
ketable orders. However, the public limit order book is not beneficial
for all market participants since their results demonstrate that welfare
is redistributed. Because of the smaller price impact of trades and
marketable orders, compensation for liquidity provision is reduced.
This benefits market order traders (liquidity demanders), but hurts sub-
mitters of limit order and specialists (liquidity suppliers). Also, floor
brokers face declining revenues since they intervene in less trades. On
the other hand, OpenBook generates additional revenues for NYSE.
While indeed there exists a clear tendency towards more trans-
parency, there is also a trend to provide market participants with a
possibility to limit their exposure. The use of hidden orders (also
called iceberg orders), where only part of an order is displayed to the
market and the rest remains hidden, has become widespread. De
Winne and D’hondt (2004) investigate how the presence of hidden
depth in the limit order book affects both implicit transaction costs
and traders’ behavior on Euronext. They show that ignoring hidden
quantities in the order book substantially underestimates actual liq-
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traders. Moreover, the presence of hidden orders at the best opposite
quote significantly increases the aggressiveness of submitted orders.
This means that traders seize the opportunity to benefit from reduced
implicit transaction costs due to some hidden depth at the best oppo-
site quote.
2. Anonymity
Related to transparency is the issue of anonymity, i.e. the degree to
which the identity of market participants is revealed. As with trans-
parency, informed traders will prefer anonymous trading, while liq-
uidity traders do not. A distinction can be made between demand and
supply side anonymity. Concealing information about the identity of
liquidity demanders in general increases the bid-ask spread, since sup-
pliers can less easily make a distinction between informed and unin-
formed traders, see e.g. Benviste, Marcus and Wilhelm (1992).
Foucault, Moinas and Theissen (2006) analyze the effect of
anonymity at the supply side on liquidity, both theoretically and empir-
ically. They show that, in an order driven market, concealing the iden-
tity of liquidity suppliers might reduce bid-ask spreads. In their model,
some “expert” traders can better assess their exposure to informed trad-
ing, and hence of the cost of providing liquidity. Without anonymity,
non-expert traders derive information from their quotes. If expert
traders bid cautiously, non-expert traders will defer from improving
their quotes. However experts also behave strategically and sometimes
bluff, i.e. set quotes as if costs of liquidity supply are high. If anonymity
is introduced, traders do no longer know who placed the quotes and
bluffing becomes less effective. Expert traders will bid more aggres-
sively in this case. It is then clear that spread and depth will be affected.
The ultimate effect depends on the proportion of expert traders, but
there are cases when the spread is reduced. They test their model by
considering the introduction of anonymity on Euronext Paris. They find
that when the limit order book became anonymous, average spreads
declined significantly, and depth decreased.
3. Tick Size
A number of empirical papers have investigated the impact of tick size
changes on market quality. Bacidore (1997), Ahn, Cao and Choe
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tick size on the TSE, while Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) and Chor-
dia and Ball (2001) (among others) deal with the changes in tick size
and the liquidity provision on the NYSE. In general, these papers show
that after the reduction in tick size, the inside spread significantly
decreased, but depth at the best bid and ask also decreased. This means
that one dimension of liquidity improves (spread) while another
(depth) deteriorates. Bourghelle and Declerck (2004) investigate the
market quality of the Paris Bourse following the introduction of the
Euro. This changed the tick size compared to prices in French Francs.
Interestingly, they find that only the depth at the best prices is signif-
icantly affected whereas the spreads remain unaltered. Stocks obtain-
ing a decrease (increase) in tick size experience a decrease (increase)
in the depth at the best prices.
4. Floor versus Screen-Based Trading Systems
A final property of trading systems is whether or not trading floor is
present. While NASDAQ or Euronext operate without a floor, the
NYSE maintains the floor for executing trades. Theoretically, Biais,
Foucault and Salanie (1998) show that large spreads and inefficient
risk sharing occur in floor markets (and also in dealer markets) but not
in screen based limit order markets.
Empirically, evidence is mixed. Venkataraman (2001) compares the
NYSE (which has a trading floor) with Euronext Paris (fully screen
based) for a sample of similar stocks and find that spreads are lower
on a floor based exchange than on an electronic exchange. Theissen
(2002) provides somewhat more direct evidence by comparing the
floor and the screen-based trading system of the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange, which operated in parallel. He finds that an electronic
(screen-based) trading system offers low spreads for liquid stocks,
while the floor is more competitive for less liquid stocks. Jain (2005)
investigates 120 stock exchanges world wide and finds that a change
from floor to electronic trading has a number of beneficial effects in
the long run. He finds that the equity premium is reduced signifi-
cantly after the switch. In addition, excess-over-the-world abnormal
returns (AR) in the announcement month is 8.99%. Cumulative AR
two years after the announcement are 28.69%. Moreover, the cost of
capital of listed firms also declined and monthly trading turnover
increased.
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A. Introduction
In Section V, liquidity was related to different elements of market
design but the focus remained on one market. Nowadays however,
stocks may trade simultaneously on different trading venues. Stocks
are not only cross-listed on different exchanges, they also trade in so-
called alternative trading systems (ATS) that emerged recently. This
evolution implies that traders must decide where to submit an order,
taking into account differences in trading costs or execution time, but
also in market design across trading venues.
In general, the fact that one asset trades in different places poten-
tially induces two opposite effects on liquidity. On the one hand, com-
petition between trading venues for order flow may force exchanges
or ATSs to decrease fees, thus resulting in lower trading costs. On the
other hand, fragmentation of the order flow between trading venues
may reduce liquidity in each venue. Moreover, in a fragmented mar-
ket, orders may execute at a price worse than the best quoted due to
violations of price priority (so called trade-throughs).
In a theoretical model Parlour and Seppi (2003) show that competi-
tion between trading venues, either because new ones open or because
of cross-listings, can increase or decrease aggregate liquidity, relative
to a single market environment. The actual outcome depends e.g. on the
trading costs faced by traders. Biais (1993) finds in a model without
asymmetric information, that the spread in fragmented and centralized
markets is equal, but it is more volatile in centralized ones. In central-
ized markets, the agent17 with the lowest reservation value sets his ask
price just below the ask of his next-best competitor. In fragmented mar-
kets, he sets his ask price below the expected next best price. His expec-
tations are less volatile than the variable itself. In the model of Pagano
(1989), informed traders have an incentive to strategically split up their
orders between markets. This however at the same time induces liq-
uidity traders to concentrate trading at one place, since this will result
in a drop of the proportion of informed trading, and in narrower spreads.
In an empirical analysis, Hasbrouck (1995) moreover shows that
often one market is the source of all price discovery, while others are
rather matching the quotes. An extreme case is provided by crossing
networks, who do not contribute at all to price discovery but derive the
price at which orders are matched from the main markets (see further).
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by traders are related to execution quality: markets reporting low exe-
cution costs and fast fills for orders subsequently receive more orders.
B. Dealer versus Limit Order Book
Seppi (1997) presents a theoretical model where a dealer with market
power competes with a public limit order book. The dealer must
respect the price, public and time priority of other traders, in other
words he must undercut other liquidity providers to obtain order flow.
The equilibrium liquidity of a market depends on the interaction
between the specialist’s strategy, the limit order book, and latent com-
petition from a trading crowd. In some cases, the dealer is simply a
trader of last resort on larger trades, while he is the primary source of
liquidity for very small orders. Seppi relates these findings to optimal
market design. He shows that large institutional traders (submitting
large orders) have a larger optimal tick size than small retail investors,
but both prefer a tick size strictly greater than zero. Moreover, a hybrid
dealer/limit order market (such as the NYSE) provides better liquid-
ity to small traders and large institutional traders, while a pure limit
order market (like Euronext) offers better liquidity for mid-size orders.
In an empirical analysis, Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) find
that dealers on the NYSE respond strongly to changes in the limit
order book when setting the prices and depths at which they are
willing to trade. In fact, economically, this turns out to be the most
important factor for revising price schedules.
C. Two Limit Order Markets
Foucault and Menkveld (2006) study competition between two limit
order books. More specifically, they analyze the entry of a new market
(i.e. EuroSETS from the London Stock Exchange), next to an incum-
bent market (Euronext) in the Netherlands. They first develop a theo-
retical model and subsequently perform an empirical analysis. In the
model, they allow for differences in order submission fees, and intro-
duce two types of brokers:
(i) smart routers, who route orders across markets to obtain the best
execution price and
(ii) non smart routers, who ignore quotes in the entrant market and
always trade in the incumbent market.
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generates two main empirical predictions. First, other things equal,
consolidated depth at a certain price (i.e. the sum of all shares avail-
able at that price or better in both markets) should be larger after
EuroSETS entry. This results is driven by the absence of time prior-
ity across markets. The reasoning is that it allows traders to jump
ahead of the queue of limit orders in one market by submitting a limit
order in the competing market. Second, the model predicts that an
increase in the proportion of smart routers coincides with an increase
of liquidity supply by the entrant market EuroSETS. The intuition is
that more smart routers increase the execution probability of limit
orders submitted to the entrant market.
Their empirical analysis confirms these predictions. More specif-
ically, they find an increase in consolidated depth after the entry of
EuroSETS. Secondly, also depth on the incumbent market Euronext
increases after the entry. The reasoning is that Euronext reduced
its fees around the entry of EuroSETS. The resulting increase in
depth more than compensates the loss of order flow to the entrant
market. Finally, EuroSETS has lower spreads and a larger share in
consolidated depth for stocks with a larger proportion of smart
routers.
D. Alternative Trading Systems
Recently, a number of alternative trading systems emerged. Broadly
speaking, these can be divided in two main categories: Electronic
Communication Networks (ECNs) and Crossing Networks (CNs).
1. ECNs
ECNs are trading systems that essentially operate as fully anonymous,
public limit order books. They are mainly successful in attracting order
flow from NASDAQ (a dealer market). ECNs obtain 42% of share
volume in NASDAQ listed stocks, compared to only 3% for NYSE
listed stocks (see Stoll (2006)). One explanation is that the NASDAQ
reform of 1997 increased the competition between dealers and ECNs
by providing traders with a better access to ECNs. In this way, traders
can e.g. save the spread, charged by dealers. Moreover, as NYSE is a
hybrid market, there is already “internal” competition between NYSE
market makers and the NYSE limit order book.
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ers. He finds that the growth of ECNs is associated with higher liq-
uidity on NASDAQ as quoted, effective, and relative bid-ask spreads
are lower and depths are larger. Moreover, markets are less concen-
trated. Fink, Fink and Weston (2006) study in addition the competi-
tive impact of ECNs on NASDAQ. Their results show that an increase
in ECN trading may have caused some traditional market makers to
exit the market for market making. Overall, ECNs seem indeed to pro-
vide a source of competition to traditional NASDAQ dealers.
Huang (2002) compares the quality of the quotes in ECNs and those
posted by NASDAQ market makers. He shows that ECNs not only
post informative quotes, but also, compared to market makers, ECNs
post quotes rapidly and are more often at the inside. Additionally,
ECN quoted spreads are smaller than dealer quoted spreads. These
results may suggest that the benefits from intermarket competition
may outweight possible costs of market fragmentation. Barclay,
Hendershott and McCormick (2003) find that ECN trades are smaller
than NASDAQ trades. However, ECN trading explains from 60% to
100% more of the efficient stock price variance than NASDAQ trades.
In other words ECN trades are much more informative and ECNs
attract more informed trades. However, ECN trades have higher
expected ex ante trading costs because market makers on NASDAQ
are able to differentiate the least informed (and hence most profitable)
trades and offer them better execution. These trades have lower effec-
tive spreads. However, because trades on ECNs are more informed,
they tend to have lower ex-post trading costs as measured by the real-
ized spread.
Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) investigate proprietary data on
order submissions to CNs, ECNs and brokers. They find that in
general realized execution costs are lower on the ATS. The cost dif-
ference between day crosses and broker-filled order is 30 basis points,
the difference between ECN and broker trades is 66 basis points. After
the reduction in tick size on the main markets, the cost difference for
CNs was not affected while the difference for ECNs declined.
2. Crossing Networks
The other form of ATS are CNs. These are defined by the SEC as
“systems that allow participants to enter unpriced orders to buy and
sell securities, these orders are crossed at a specified time at a price
306
0139-07_TEM_07-2_05_Wuyts  6/22/07  15:23  Page 306derived from another market”. Note that CNs are thus periodic trading
systems. If executed, orders obtain a better price (midquote), but
traders face the risk of non-execution19. As CNs clearly do not con-
tribute to price discovery, they need an efficient base market. More-
over, compared to other trading systems, CNs are very opaque, since
they do not disseminate any information about order imbalances, the
identity of traders, .... A detailed discussion of CNs can be found in
Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts (2007).
The interaction between a CN and a dealer market (DM) is modeled
in a static model in Hendershott and Mendelson (2000). The dynam-
ics of the interaction between a CN and a dealer market are studied in
Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts (2006). Hendershott and Mendelson
(2000) consider a random number of informed and uninformed traders,
who simultaneously submit single-unit orders to either the DM or the
CN. When orders are not executed on the CN, they can be resubmit-
ted to the dealer. A trader’s choice depends on its own characteristics
(e.g. his patience to trade and his valuation of the stock), as well as
other parameters (such as execution probabilities on the CN, the spread
in the DM, ...). Their model shows that each market caters for a spe-
cific type of trader. Moreover, DMs are influenced in two opposite
ways by competition from the CN. On the one hand, there is risk shar-
ing as dealers’ inventory and adverse selection costs are lowered by
exclusive CN traders, resulting in narrower spreads. On the other hand,
opportunistic CN trading (i.e. using the DM as “market of last resort”)
may widen the DM-spread. The reasoning is that, in this case, the CN
is skimming off part of the uninformed traders. Consequently, this frac-
tion of uninformed traders cannot be “used” anymore by dealers to
compensate their losses to informed traders. Within the CN, also two
opposite forces are at work. First, a positive liquidity externality exists,
as an increase in CN trading volume benefits all CN traders and
attracts additional liquidity. Second, when the CN becomes sufficiently
liquid, this liquidity externality may be dominated by a negative
crowding externality: low-liquidity preference traders compete with
the higher-liquidity value traders on the same market side. Combined
with the competition effect, the resulting overall impact remains
ambiguous. The emergence of the additional CN trading venue bene-
fits some traders, while harming others.
Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts (2006) investigate the interaction
of a CN and a continuous (one-tick) DM. More specifically, they ana-
lyze the impact on the composition and dynamics of the order flow on
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designs:
(i) transparency,
(ii) complete opaqueness, and
(iii) partial opaqueness.
The benchmark transparency case reflects that traders are fully
informed about past order flow and hence observe the prevailing state
of the CN’s order book before determining their strategy. This results
in pre- and post-trade transparency. However, in reality CNs are rather
opaque. This is incorporated by analyzing two different degrees of
opaqueness: partial and complete. While partial opaqueness implies
that traders observe previous trades at the DM but not submissions to
the CN, complete opaqueness entails that traders are uninformed on
both past CN and DM order flow. Their model leads to several results.
First, in common to the three informational settings, they find that an
increase in the DM’s relative spread augments the CN’s order flow.
Therefore, it can be expected that CNs will be more successful in mar-
kets where spreads are substantial. At the same time price discovery
should be sufficiently informative as the CN “free rides” on informa-
tion about prices from the DM. Second, a CN and a DM cater to dif-
ferent types of traders. Investors with a high willingness to trade are
more likely to opt for immediacy and prefer to trade at a DM. The
existence of a CN results in “order creation”: investors with a low
willingness to trade submit orders to a CN whereas they would never
trade at a DM. Third, the transparency and partial opaqueness settings
produce systematic patterns in order flow. In particular, for the trans-
parency case, they find that the probability of observing a CN order
at the same side of the market is smaller after such an order than if it
was not. Also, the probability of observing a sell at the DM decreases
and the probability of a buyer trading on the DM increases when
the previous order was a CN buy. Fourth, their results highlight that
it is important to take into account the interaction between trading sys-
tems when measuring “normal” order flow. For example, when look-
ing at an individual trading system, some order or trade flow sequences
could wrongly be interpreted as being driven by information events,
whereas they are caused by the interaction of trading systems.
Empirically, Gresse (2006) shows that risk-sharing benefits from
CN trading outweight fragmentation and cream-skimming20 costs.
Moreover, dealers’spreads are negatively correlated with CN trading.
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0139-07_TEM_07-2_05_Wuyts  6/22/07  15:23  Page 308She also documents that execution probabilities on CNs are rather low
(2-4%). Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004) compare the price impact
of block trades across the upstairs market, a CN and the limit order
book. The ATS are found to be beneficial to market participants as the
upstairs market and the CN offers a lower price impact. Moreover,
they do not harm liquidity in the main market.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper discussed the determinants and implications of a key ele-
ments of well-functioning financial markets: liquidity. This concept
was defined as how easy traders can buy or sell large numbers of
shares without large price effects. I argued that liquidity comprises
several interacting dimensions: spread, depth, resiliency and immedi-
acy. These dimensions were discussed for a quote driven and an order
driven market. Also other design elements of trading system, such as
transparency, anonymity and the presence of a trading floor, were
investigated. Subsequently, the focus shifted from one market to the
impact of intermarket competition on liquidity. In bringing together
some main conclusions from the analysis, I focus below on four ben-
eficiaries of liquidity: traders, stock exchanges (or alternative trading
systems), listed firms and the stability of the financial system.
First, liquidity is obviously relevant for traders as it directly deter-
mines their cost of trading. Order handling costs, inventory and asym-
metric information were shown to drive trading costs. Moreover, also
market design is relevant. However, results are not always uniform.
While transparency in general tends to benefit traders, certain types
of traders may prefer less transparent markets, e.g. when they need to
carry out a large transaction and do not want to reveal their trading
intention. Similarly, lower tick sizes will lower spreads, but a too low
tick size may actually harm traders as e.g. limit order traders may not
receive appropriate compensation for the risks associated with a limit
order. Liquidity also determines the return traders require to invest in
a stock. The reasoning is that liquidity and liquidity risk are factors that
are priced in the market.
Secondly, liquidity is important for stock exchanges and trading
systems in general. In competition with each other and with alterna-
tive trading systems, liquidity tends to be an important argument to
attract order flow and listings. Moreover, liquidity exhibits an
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mal design of the trading system can help trading venues to attract
traders. Moreover, trading venues can tailor their trading rules such
that they cater to specific types of traders. The emergence of ATSs is
an illustration of this point, e.g. a CN can allow large traders to exe-
cute their trades without large price impacts. But also the traditional
exchanges differentiate across traders. Both NYSE and NASDAQ
acquired an ECN and have set-up (or announced) a CN.
Thirdly, listed firms benefit from more liquidity. Liquidity is ben-
eficial for the cost of capital of a firm through its impact on expected
returns required by investors. Obviously, firms then have an incentive
to increase the liquidity of their equity such that they can benefit from
a lower cost of capital. Although a number of elements that impact liq-
uidity are outside the firm’s control (i.e. those related to the setup of
the trading system, e.g. anonymity, transparency, the presence of deal-
ers, ...), the firm is able to influence some factors. First, it can set-up
an effective and open communication with the press and analysts. Dis-
closing more and better information should narrow the gap between
informed and uninformed traders. This reduces asymmetric informa-
tion in the market, leading to a reduction in the spread. Secondly, firms
can request a listing or cross-listing on a liquid exchange. Pagano,
Randl, Roell and Zechner (2001) indeed find that firms are more likely
to cross-list in liquid markets.
Finally, liquidity is also important for the stability of the financial
system as a whole. The above discussed “bright view” in liquidity
argues that liquid markets invite a larger number of traders to partic-
ipate in the market. This larger base can then increase the ability of
the system to cushion large shocks.
While the survey in this paper provided some evidence on liquid-
ity, there are still ample areas for future research. First, the sometimes
conflicting empirical evidence calls for more research on the optimal
design of markets. Secondly, traditional exchanges are to an increas-
ing extend confronted with competition from alternative trading sys-
tems. An analysis of the (dynamic) impact of these ATSs and of their
functioning is still in its infancy. Thirdly, a clear tendency exists
towards globalization of trading: recently NYSE and Euronext merged,
while plans are announced for an alliance with the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. This would create an almost global market on equity trad-
ing. The impact of this globalization on liquidity has not yet been
extensively studied. Fourth, while the literature has reached agreement
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tle is known about which elements of market design affect this pric-
ing of liquidity (risk). Fifth, to what extend are portfolio decisions of
traders influenced by liquidity risk and execution risk? All these ques-
tions provide an intriguing and challenging path for future research.
NOTES
1. For a definition of the concept “liquidity”, we refer to Section III.
2. Tick size (or minimum price variation) refers to the minimum amount in which the
price of a security can change.
3. A limitation of the current paper is that I restrict the discussion to stock markets. How-
ever, a wide number of insights can be translated to other markets as well. Lyons
(2001) presents an overview of the market microstructure approach to FOREX mar-
kets. An analysis of bond market liquidity can be found in Chordia, Sarkar and Sub-
rahmanyam (2005), while Cheung, de Jong and Rindi (2005) discuss the microstruc-
ture of MTS, the trading system for government bonds. Hartmann, Manna and
Manzanares (2001) analyze the microstructure of the money market. In these contri-
butions, the insights from the literature on stock markets are applied. Therefore, the
methodologies, insights and intuition presented in the current paper, also extend to a
range of other financial markets.
4. See e.g. Domowitz and Steil (1999) or Jain (2002) for recent surveys of stock mar-
kets.
5. ECNs basically function as an anonymous limit order book. CNs are systems that
allow participants to enter unpriced orders to buy and sell securities; orders are crossed
at a specified time at a price derived from another market. CNs are thus periodic sys-
tems.
6. As we will explain below, in limit order markets, unexecuted limit orders form the sup-
ply of liquidity while market orders are demanding liquidity.
7. For excellent surveys, we refer to Madhavan (2000) and Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005).
An overview of the early (mainly theoretical) literature can be found in O’Hara (1995).
8. The main assumptions are:
1) Buy and sell orders arrive randomly;
2) Expected returns are constant over time;
3) The market exhibits strong-form efficiency (i.e. an incoming buy or sell order does
not lead to a revision of the value of the asset, as is the case e.g. in models of
asymmetric information, see further).
9. Recall that on the NYSE, dealers compete with a limit order book.
10. To be precise: the current best quote is above the expected value of the asset rounded
to the nearest tick.
11. We focus on dynamic models. For a static model of limit order markets, see e.g.
Glosten (1994).
12. Picking off risk refers to the possibility that, after a limit order has been submitted,
new public information might arrive. This may create a winner’s curse problem for
limit order traders since their orders are more likely to be executed (i.e. picked off) at
a loss when their orders become mispriced.
13. A best limit update is recorded when either the best ask or bid price, and/or depth at
these prices change.
14. Note that in part because of this paper, the SEC imposed reforms on Nasdaq in 1997,
which alleviated the issue, see Barclay et al. (1999).
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0139-07_TEM_07-2_05_Wuyts  6/22/07  15:23  Page 31115. A notable exception is in-house matching or internalization.
16. This is the so-called OpenBook service, introduced on January 24, 2002. It shows the
aggregate limit order volume available in the book at each price. The information
about depth is updated every ten seconds. It reflects only the depth in the limit order
book, and e.g. not those offered by specialists. Note that this information is not for free
since subscribers pay a fee for the service.
17. An agent can be a dealer or a limit order trader.
18. These are trades where there is a violation of price priority. In other words, such trades
are not executed at the best possible price. The reasoning in Menkveld and Foucault
(2006) that some traders only consider one market, and not the entrant market (which
potentially may offer a better price).
19. If at the time of the cross, there are more buy than sell orders, part of the buy orders
will not execute. The exact choice of which buy orders are then executed depends on
the matching algorithm implemented by a CN.
20. Cream-skimming refers to the fact that some uninformed traders prefer the CN
and cannot be used anymore by the dealer to compensate his losses on informed
trades.
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